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The Morality of 
Killing Human 
Embryos
Bonnie Steinbock
Embryonic stem cell research is morally and politically controversial because the process of deriving the embryonic stem (ES) cells kills 
embryos. If embryos are, as some would claim, human 
beings like you and me, then ES cell research is clearly 
impermissible. If, on the other hand, the blastocysts 
from which embryonic stem cells are derived are not 
yet human beings, but rather microscopic balls of un-
differentiated cells, as others maintain, then ES cell 
research is probably morally permissible. Whether the 
research can be justified depends on such issues as its 
cost, chance of success, and numbers likely to ben-
efit. But this is an issue for any research project, not 
just ES cell research. What makes the debate over ES 
cell research controversial is that it, like the debate 
over abortion, raises “questions that politicians cannot 
settle: when does human life begin, and what is the 
moral status of the human embryo?”1 This paper looks 
at several theories of moral status and their implica-
tions for embryo research.
When we ask whether a being has moral status, we 
are asking whether it counts or matters from the moral 
point of view; whether it must be considered in our 
moral deliberations. It seems obvious that not every-
thing has moral status. We are not required to con-
sider the impact of our moral decisions on mere things 
– for example, ordinary rocks. It seems equally obvious 
that paradigmatic people – people like you and me 
– do have moral status. In fact, most people take it for 
granted that even if moral status isn’t limited to people 
(that animals count, for example) human beings count 
for more. To express this in Kantian terms, humanity 
has a dignity and worth which separates humankind 
from the rest of creation. Because this view is com-
monplace in moral thinking and in the law, we can call 
it the common-sense view of moral status.
The Common-Sense View: The Biological 
Humanity Criterion
The common-sense view of moral status is derived 
from the Judeo-Christian tradition which teaches that 
only human beings are created in God’s image, and 
therefore human beings alone have this special moral 
status. In addition, this special moral status belongs 
to all human beings, regardless of race, ethnicity, na-
tionality, or gender. We are all God’s children. Com-
pared to views that limit moral status to members of 
one’s own group or tribe, the Judeo-Christian view is 
quite progressive. Theoretically (though often not in 
reality), it prohibits the enslaving or killing of other 
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human beings, simply because they 
are “outsiders.” The secular version 
of this view bases the unique moral 
status of humanity on a biological 
category – membership in the spe-
cies homo sapiens. 
The biological humanity crite-
rion of moral status states that all 
and only human beings, members 
of our species, have full moral sta-
tus. But even those who agree on 
the criterion may differ on this question: when does a 
human being come into existence? Sometimes this is 
put in a different way: when does human life begin? 
But this question, familiar from the abortion debate, 
poses the issue in a misleading way, because every cell 
in your body is both human (possessed of a human 
genome) and alive. Human gametes (ova and sperm) 
are alive, and sperm even swim. So the question, “when 
does human life begin?” is better understood as asking, 
“when does an individual human organism come into 
existence?” 
One answer is that a human organism comes into ex-
istence at conception. Those who hold the conception 
view adopt the biological humanity criterion of moral 
status, which says that all and only human organisms 
have full moral status. In addition, they believe that a 
human organism exists at the moment of conception. 
Indeed, they usually hold that this is a plain matter of 
biological fact.
However, this is dubious, as there are biological rea-
sons to think that the unique human organism begins 
to exist only some time after the beginning of fertiliza-
tion. Fertilization or conception does not occur at a 
precise moment. It is a process taking place over hours, 
even days. The process of conception is not completed 
until syngamy, when the chromosomes from the egg 
and the sperm have merged, some time after the sperm 
has penetrated the egg. However, even syngamy may 
not mark the beginning of a human organism. Ron 
Green points out, 
 biologists usually describe the cells of an organ-
ism has having the full range of cellular structure 
including a single cell nucleus that contains DNA 
within its own nuclear membrane. But at syngamy 
the zygote has no definitive nuclear membrane… 
A distinctive diploid cell nucleus does not make its 
appearance until the two-cell stage, after the zygote 
undergoes its first cell division…2  
Moreover, in the early stages of an embryo’s life, many 
of its cells, or blastomeres, remain “totipotent.” This 
means that each blastomere is undifferentiated and 
remains capable, if properly manipulated, of devel-
oping into a full human being. One kind of cloning 
– called embryo splitting or blastomere separation – is 
accomplished in this way. Embryo splitting also occurs 
naturally in the case of identical twins (or triplets). 
Green comments, “if biological humanness starts with 
the appearance of a unique diploid genome, twins and 
triplets are living evidence that the early embryo is 
not yet one human being, but a community of possi-
bly different individuals held together by a gelatinous 
membrane.”3 He goes on to quote an embryology text 
as saying, “a genetically unique but non-individuated 
embryo has yet to acquire determinate individuality, a 
stable human identity.”4 In this view, a genuine human 
organism begins to exist only after twinning is no lon-
ger possible: at the beginning of gastrulation when the 
primitive streak (the precursor of the nervous system) 
forms. In a pregnancy, gastrulation coincides with im-
plantation, the imbedding of the embryo in the uterus, 
which occurs about fourteen days after fertilization. 
The debate over when a human organism comes into 
existence occurs within the context of the biological 
humanity criterion. However, the criterion itself has 
been challenged. 
The Person View
In her classic article, “On the Moral and Legal Sta-
tus of Abortion,”5 Mary Anne Warren argues that the 
conservative view on abortion rests on a confusion be-
tween two distinct senses of “human being.” One sense 
is biological or genetic. It refers to the species to which 
an entity belongs. Human fetuses are unquestionably 
human in the biological sense. However, it does not fol-
low from their genetic humanity that they are human 
in the other sense, the moral sense, which refers to 
their moral status and rights. Why should a biological 
category confer a special moral status? The belief that 
humanness does imply such a status and rights (human 
rights) stems from a failure to distinguish between the 
two senses. To avoid this confusion, Warren suggests 
that we reserve the term “human” for the biological 
or genetic sense, and use the term “person” to refer 
to beings who are full-fledged members of the moral 
The common-sense view of moral status is derived 
from the Judeo-Christian tradition which teaches 
that only human beings are created in God’s image, 
and therefore human beings alone have this special 
moral status. In addition, this special moral status 
belongs to all human beings, regardless of race, 
ethnicity, nationality, or gender.
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community, possessed of moral rights – in particular, 
the right to life. This enables us to avoid begging the 
question in the abortion debate, for it remains an open 
question whether a human fetus is a person with a 
right to life.
Why not base moral status and moral rights on spe-
cies membership? After all, all the persons we know 
are, in fact, members of the species homo sapiens. Why 
not use species membership as a marker for moral per-
sonhood? The reason is the arbitrariness of limiting 
moral status to genetic human beings. This can be seen 
if we imagine coming across an extraterrestrial like 
the eponymous character in the movie, E.T. If we were 
deciding what it would be morally permissible to do 
to him – say, put him in a zoo, or make him into ham-
burger – surely the question would not be decided by 
the number of chromosomes in his cells (if he even had 
chromosomes). His not being a member of the species 
homo sapiens would not determine his moral status. 
It seems likely that we would regard him as a person 
– a non-human person – with all the rights of any one 
of us.
The example of E.T. is meant to show that biological 
humanity isn’t a necessary condition of full moral sta-
tus. Instead, moral status is based on certain psycho-
logical characteristics, such as sentience, conscious-
ness, self-consciousness, the ability to use language, 
rationality, and moral agency. These characteristics 
are typical of members of our species, but not necessar-
ily limited to them, as the example of E.T. is intended 
to show. Moreover, there seem to be members of our 
species who lack these person-making characteristics, 
such as anencephalic babies and patients in persistent 
vegetative states. They are biologically human, but not 
persons, and thus do not have the moral status reserved 
to persons.
An objection made to the person view is that, with-
out an account of the moral relevance of person-mak-
ing characteristics, it is as arbitrary as a theory based 
on species membership. Why should moral status and 
moral rights be limited to sentient, self-conscious, lan-
guage-using, rational agents? Moreover, depending on 
how many person-making characteristics are needed 
for full moral status and rights, the person view ap-
pears to exclude those human beings who, due to severe 
developmental disabilities or mental illness or senility, 
or even infancy, do not have the capacity to reason or 
use language. It is hard to accept that human beings in 
these categories – who are often members of our own 
families – are not moral persons, with the same moral 
status and rights as the rest of us. Advocates of the bio-
logical humanity criterion maintain that any criterion 
other than genetic humanity will have this fatal flaw.
The challenge, then, is to construct a theory of moral 
status that is neither arbitrary (like the biological hu-
manity criterion) nor unduly restrictive (like the per-
son view). Moreover, the view should explain the moral 
relevance of its criterion for moral status.
The Interest View6
The interest view bases moral status on the posses-
sion of interests. The view derives from Joel Feinberg’s 
“interest principle,”7 which was intended to answer 
the question, what kinds of beings can logically have 
rights? Feinberg suggests that the answer comes from 
the purpose or function of rights, which is to protect 
the interests of the being alleged to have the rights. He 
usefully analogizes having an interest in something to 
having a “stake” in it. I am better off if the things in 
which I have a stake, such as my health, my career, my 
assets, my family, flourish or prosper. Their flourishing 
is in my interest. Feinberg writes:
 One’s interests, then, taken as a miscellaneous col-
lection, consist of all those things in which one has 
a stake, whereas one’s interest in the singular, one’s 
personal interest or self-interest, consists in the 
harmonious advancement of all of one’s interests 
in the plural. These interests...are distinguishable 
components of a person’s well-being: he flour-
ishes or languishes as they flourish or languish. 
What promotes them is to his advantage or in his 
interest; what thwarts them is to his detriment or 
against his interest.8
This is not to claim a one-to-one connection between 
what a person desires and what is in his self-interest. 
I can take an interest in something (like junk food) 
that is not in my interest; and something can be in my 
interest but not be something I take an interest in (like 
exercise). But the reason exercise is in my interest, and 
junk food is not, is that exercise promotes other goals 
and desires of mine, such as staying healthy and alive, 
and eating junk food does not. If I had no desires, goals, 
or preferences at all, nothing would be in my interest. 
Unless a being has interests and a welfare of its own, 
it makes no sense to ascribe rights to it. Feinberg’s 
insight about the logical conditions of having rights 
can be applied more generally to having moral status. 
To have moral status is to count or matter, from the 
moral point of view. If a being has moral status, then its 
interests must be considered when we engage in moral 
deliberation. If a being has no interests, its interests 
cannot be considered. So the possession of interests 
is a necessary condition of having moral status, and I 
would argue that it is also a sufficient condition. That 
is, if a being has interests, there is no justification for 
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ignoring those interests when making moral decisions. 
(It is a separate question how much weight to accord to 
the interests of different beings, that is, whether there 
are other factors that give some beings a higher moral 
status than others.)
The Feinbergian account of having interests as hav-
ing stakes in things suggests a conceptual link between 
interests and consciousness. Only conscious beings 
– beings with some sort of mental life, however rudi-
mentary – can have wants; only beings with wants can 
have a stake in anything; only beings that can have 
a stake in something can have interests of their own. 
Non-conscious beings, whether mere things (like cars 
and rocks and works of art) or living things without 
nervous systems (like plants), have no interests of their 
own. This is not to say that they cannot be cared for or 
neglected; repaired or destroyed; nourished or killed. 
It is rather to say that it does not matter to non-con-
scious beings what we do to them. We can preserve 
their existence, and even promote their welfare in the 
sense of making them better entities of a certain kind. 
For example, we can fertilize the roses so that they 
grow vigorously and bloom; we can bring in the car for 
regular service so that it runs beautifully. However, we 
cannot do these things out of concern for what matters 
to them, because nothing matters to them. They do not 
have a stake in anything, including their own existence. 
For this reason, I maintain that they, unlike conscious 
beings, do not have a welfare or sake of their own.
Some will object that we cannot base moral status on 
consciousness unless we have a definition of conscious-
ness, but there does not seem to be any satisfactory, 
non-circular definition. Acknowledging the problem, 
David Boonin says, “It is tempting to say that to be 
conscious is to be aware of something, for example, but 
then awareness will surely have to be defined in terms 
of being in a conscious state.”9 What follows from the 
absence of a definition of consciousness? Not much, 
Boonin argues. It is not as if we had no idea what con-
sciousness is. He writes:
 As Nagel famously put it, using an expression that 
has since become ubiquitous in discussions of the 
subject, “an organism has conscious mental states 
if and only if there is something that it is like to be 
that organism – something it is like for the organ-
ism.” Even if this does not constitute a definition 
of consciousness, you do know what I am talking 
about when I refer to the fact that there is some-
thing that it is like to be you when you see a clear 
blue sky, hear a shrill scream, feel a sharp prick, or 
a cold wind, or a burning itch. And this is enough to 
make clear what is meant by the claim that there is 
a morally relevant difference between an organism 
that is conscious in this sense and an organism that 
is not.10
The morally relevant difference between conscious and 
non-consciousness beings is that conscious beings have 
interests and a welfare of their own, compounded out 
of those interests. Non-conscious beings do not have 
either of these things.
Sentience is only one form of conscious awareness, 
but it is a very important one. If a being is sentient, that 
is, it can experience treatment as painful, it has at least 
one interest: the interest in not experiencing pain. The 
fact that a being can suffer gives us a reason to treat 
it in certain ways, and not in other ways. It matters 
to sentient beings what one does to them, and this is 
why they have moral claims on us. To take a homely 
example, it is fine if a child plucks the petals off a daisy 
while saying “He loves me, he loves me not.” It is not 
fine if the child recites the rhyme while pulling the legs 
off an insect, or the feathers off a (trapped) bird. 
Implications of the Interest View for Embryos
Embryos are not mere things. They are alive and, under 
certain conditions, have the potential to become be-
ings with interests – indeed, to become people, like you 
and me. But their potential to become persons does 
not give them the moral status or the rights of actual 
persons. Early embryos, indeed early-gestation fetuses, 
have no consciousness, no awareness, no experiences 
of any kind, even the most rudimentary. Without even 
the precursor of a nervous system, pre-implantation 
embryos cannot possibly have any kind of conscious-
ness. Without consciousness, they cannot have desires; 
without desires, they cannot have interests. It is not 
wrong to kill embryos because it doesn’t matter to an 
embryo whether it is killed or goes on living. Its con-
It matters to sentient beings what one does to them, and this is why  
they have moral claims on us. To take a homely example, it is fine if a  
child plucks the petals off a daisy while saying, “He loves me, he loves  
me not.” It is not fine if the child recites the rhyme while pulling  
legs off an insect, or the feathers off a (trapped) bird.
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tinued existence is clearly not something an embryo 
takes an interest in, because it is impossible for a non-
conscious, non-sentient being to take an interest in 
anything. More importantly, the interest view main-
tains that continued existence is not in the interest of 
a non-sentient fetus. For continued existence to be in 
its interest, it would have to have a welfare of its own, 
compounded out of all of its interests taken together. 
Lacking interests, embryos do not have a welfare of 
their own. In this respect, they are like gametes. Gam-
etes are alive and human, but this is not sufficient for 
moral status. To have moral status is to be the kind of 
being whose interests and welfare we moral agents are 
required to consider. Without interests, there is noth-
ing to consider. This is not to say that there might not 
be other reasons, including moral reasons, to protect 
non-interested beings. It is to say that these reasons 
cannot stem from their own interests or welfare, since 
they have none. Indeed, on a plausible conception 
of harming as setting back a being’s interests, it fol-
lows that killing non-interested beings does not harm 
them.11 If this sounds odd, it is because, for us, being 
killed is ordinarily the greatest of harms. But that is 
because we have interests, and in particular, an inter-
est in continuing to exist. However, if a being has no 
interests, death is not a harm to it, any more than being 
destroyed is a harm to an automobile. 
Of course, embryos differ from automobiles in one 
very significant way: embryos are living beings with 
the potential to develop into human persons, just like 
you or me, if they are not killed. In a now-classic article, 
Don Marquis argues that it is wrong to kill fetuses for 
the very same reason that it is wrong to kill you or 
me: because doing so deprives them (and us) of our 
valuable futures. In the next section, I will assess the 
Valuable Futures argument and its implications for the 
morality of killing embryos.
Marquis and the Valuable Futures Argument
According to Marquis, both sides of the abortion de-
bate have insurmountable problems. What is needed is 
a fresh start, an account of why killing is wrong in the 
paradigm cases in which everyone would agree that it 
is wrong – namely, the killing of adult human beings, 
like you or me. Killing adult human beings is prima 
facie wrong because killing them deprives them of their 
future. Marquis writes:
 The loss of one’s life is one of the greatest losses one 
can suffer. The loss of one’s life deprives one of all 
the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments 
that would otherwise have constituted one’s future. 
Therefore, killing someone is wrong, primarily 
because the killing inflicts (one of) the greatest pos-
sible losses on the victim.…When I am killed, I am 
deprived both of what I now value which would 
have been part of my future personal life, but also 
what I would come to value. Therefore, when I 
die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future.  
Inflicting this loss on me is ultimately what makes 
killing me wrong. This being the case, it would 
seem that what makes killing any adult human 
being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of his 
or her future.12
But exactly the same is true of killing a human fetus, 
and so abortion is, prima facie, wrong. Prima facie be-
cause killing is wrong only if it deprives the one killed 
of a “valuable future” or a “future-like-ours” (FLO, as 
it has come to be referred to). Thus, the valuable fu-
tures argument does not imply that it is wrong to kill 
someone in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) because 
someone in PVS no longer has a valuable future. It’s 
also consistent with voluntary euthanasia, because per-
sons who are severely and incurably ill and who face 
a future of pain and despair and who wish to die will 
not have suffered a loss if they are killed, because the 
future of which they are deprived is not considered 
by them to be a valuable one. Equally, the aborting of 
fetuses with defects so severe as to prevent them hav-
ing FLO might be justifiable on Marquis’s account. 
How severe would the disabling condition have to be 
to make abortion morally permissible? Is it only lethal 
conditions (such as Tay-Sachs disease) which deprive 
fetuses of FLO? Or could non-lethal conditions, such 
as mental retardation, deprive a fetus of FLO, and thus 
justify abortion? Marquis does not address these sorts 
of questions, indeed, does not provide an account of 
“just what it is about my future or the futures of other 
adult human beings which make it wrong to kill us.”13 
His aim is, rather, to show that abortion is in general a 
grave wrong. For most fetuses clearly do have valuable 
futures. If they are not aborted, they will come to have 
lives they will value and enjoy, just as you and I value 
and enjoy our lives. Therefore, abortion is seriously 
wrong for the same reason that killing an innocent 
adult human being is seriously wrong: it deprives the 
victim of his or her valuable future.
On the interest view, the killing of non-sentient be-
ings is not seriously wrong because non-sentient beings 
are not deprived of anything they want or have a stake 
in by being killed. Marquis thinks that this reveals a 
fundamental flaw in the interest view, or indeed in 
any sentience- or desire-based view. First, it seems to 
imply that it is not wrong to kill someone in a revers-
ible coma or even in deep and dreamless sleep. Such a 
person is not now conscious or sentient. If we explain 
the wrongness of killing him by appealing to his future 
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conscious states, then it seems that it is equally wrong 
to kill a pre-conscious fetus, who will become conscious 
and sentient in the natural course of events, if it is not 
aborted. Either the interest view entails that it is mor-
ally permissible to kill temporarily comatose adults, 
in which case it cannot be the right view of moral sta-
tus, or it must concede that it is wrong to kill fetuses, 
in which case it cannot be the basis for a defense of 
abortion. By contrast, the FLO account can explain the 
wrongness of killing temporarily unconscious adults; 
this deprives them of their valuable futures.
Second, Marquis argues, the interest view cannot ex-
plain why it is wrong to kill someone who is conscious 
and sentient, but who does not want to go on living. If 
it is the desire to go on living that makes killing some-
one seriously wrong, then presumably it is not wrong 
to kill someone who does not have the desire to go 
on living, due to (treatable) depression. But of course, 
Marquis argues, it is wrong, and the FLO account can 
explain why. A person can have a valuable future, even 
if, due to depression, he does not now have the desire 
to go on living. It would be seriously wrong to kill him 
and thereby to deprive him of that valuable future. 
(Presumably it would not be wrong to kill someone 
whose depression was untreatable and who faced “a 
future of pain and despair.” At least, it would not wrong 
the person killed, though Marquis leaves it open that 
there might be other reasons why killing him would 
be wrong.)
The interest view is not vulnerable to these alleged 
counter-examples. The difference between a fetus and 
a temporarily comatose adult (TCA) is that a TCA has 
desires, including a desire to go on living, that make it 
seriously wrong to kill him. The same is not true of an 
embryo or first-trimester fetus, which has no desires at 
all.14 Admittedly, a TCA does not have any conscious 
desires. But even while he is unconscious, he still has 
desires, just as he still has beliefs. David Boonin points 
out that not all of our beliefs are ones of which we are 
consciously aware: they are not all occurrent beliefs. 
To illustrate the dispositional nature of many of our 
beliefs, Boonin gives the following example. Ten min-
utes ago you probably were not consciously aware of 
believing that a triangle has three sides. Yet if I were 
to ask you, “how many sides does a triangle have?” you 
would be disposed to answer, “three.” That is why it 
is a dispositional belief. Nevertheless, it is one of your 
beliefs, a belief you already have. As Boonin puts it, 
“you do not lose all of your beliefs each time you go to 
bed and then acquire a new and identical set of beliefs 
each time you wake up. You retain your beliefs as dis-
positional beliefs and occasionally have some or others 
as occurrent beliefs.”15
Similarly, if you desire not to be killed, you continue 
to have that desire dispositionally while you are in a 
reversible coma. On the basis of this desire, we can 
ascribe to you an interest in continued existence, an 
interest that exerts a moral claim on the rest of us not 
to kill you while you are temporarily comatose. But the 
same cannot be said of a being, like an embryo, that has 
never been conscious and so has no desires, occurrent 
or dispositional, and hence no interests.
In a forthcoming article, “Abortion Revisited,” Mar-
quis writes, “Boonin’s account of and defense of a dis-
positional desire strategy for dealing with the alleged 
temporarily unconscious adult counterexample to the 
present desire view seems reasonable.”16 I take this to 
mean that Marquis now agrees that the alleged coun-
ter-example of the temporarily comatose adult is not 
a problem for desire- or sentience-based accounts. 
But what about someone who has no desire, occur-
rent or dispositional, to go on living, due to severe but 
temporary depression? Can the interest view 
explain why it would be seriously wrong to 
kill such a person without at the same time 
implying that it would be seriously wrong to 
kill a fetus?
Boonin responds by arguing that some-
times we need to correct a person’s actual de-
sires because, due to various distorting condi-
tions, they do not represent what the individual really 
wants. He writes, “…in many cases in which we believe 
that the present desires of others are morally signifi-
cant, we distinguish between the actual content of the 
desire that a person has given her actual circumstances 
and the content the desire she actually has would have 
had if the actual desire had been formed under more 
ideal circumstances.”17 In the case of the depressed per-
son who does not want to live, it is the depression that 
makes him unable to think clearly and unable to enjoy 
his life. When he comes out of the depression, life will 
seem to him to be worth living again. So of course it 
would be seriously wrong to kill him while he is in the 
depressed state. As Boonin puts it, “…when someone’s 
desires are such that they would very strongly desire 
that you not do something to them were they able to 
reflect more clearly on the question, then that counts 
as a very strong moral reason not to do it.”18
Marquis thinks that the case of the depressed person 
(“Hans” in Boonin’s example) and the fetus are analo-
Abortion is seriously wrong for the same 
reason that killing an innocent adult human 
being is seriously wrong: it deprives the 
victim of his or her valuable future.
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gous. If what makes killing Hans seriously wrong is 
that Hans would want to go on living if he were able to 
think clearly, then why can’t we say that what makes 
killing the fetus wrong is that it would want to go on 
living, if it could think about it. This is not like saying 
that a rock would want to go on living if it could think 
about it, because unlike a rock, a fetus has a future of 
value, that is, a life that it will value in the future. In 
this respect, the fetus is just like Hans. And so Marquis 
writes, “Fetuses are quite different. Hypothetical de-
sires can be attributed as easily to fetuses as to Hans.”19 
However, fetuses do not have distorted desires, which 
need correcting in order to perceive what they really 
want. Preconscious fetuses do not have desires at all. 
It seems to me one thing to ascribe an ideal or hypo-
thetical desire to a person whose desires have been 
distorted, and quite another to ascribe hypothetical de-
sires to a being incapable of having any desires. In any 
event, I am not sure how much Marquis wants or needs 
to base his argument on the ascription of hypotheti-
cal desires to fetuses, as he has a different argument, 
which is not dependent on the existence of such de-
sires. He suggests that we can “…attribute interests to 
a presently insentient being in virtue of its well-being 
at some future sentient stage of its natural history.”20 
In other words, although the fetus is now unconscious 
and has no desires, it can still have an interest in its 
future, in the sense that its future is in its interest. The 
motivation for this claim is the view of the fetus as just 
one stage in a person’s natural history. If my life and 
my future existence are something I value, then it is 
rational for me to be glad that I was not killed at an 
earlier stage, for example, when I was a fetus. My valu-
able future is its valuable future. Having that future 
(that is, not being killed) is as much in its interest as it 
is in mine. Or rather, not being killed is as much in my 
interest when I was a fetus as it is in my interest now.
McMahan’s Mind Essentialism
So the next question is, was I ever a fetus? That may 
seem indisputable, given the biological facts. Everyone, 
surely, started life as a zygote, which developed into an 
embryo, which became a fetus, and then was born as 
a baby. However, this is exactly what Jeff McMahan 
wants to deny. He writes, 
 …even if we grant that a new human organism be-
gins to exist at conception, it follows from this fact 
that we began to exist at conception only if we are 
human organisms.…if I am a human organism, I 
began to exist when this organism did. But the as-
sumption that I am numerically identical with the 
organism with which (to put it as neutrally as pos-
sible) I coexist is hardly uncontroversial.21 
McMahan thinks that the most plausible account of 
what I essentially am is an embodied consciousness. 
And if that’s the case, then I never existed as a noncon-
scious fetus. I came into existence when my organism 
began to be conscious – sometime between 20 and 28 
weeks of gestation.22 Summarizing McMahan’s posi-
tion, David DeGrazia writes,
 …the thesis of mind essentialism implies that early 
fetuses, lacking minds, cannot become minded 
beings, since it asserts that anything that is ever 
minded is always minded. Thus, early abortions 
do not kill beings with significant moral status, 
making these abortions “relevantly like contracep-
tion and wholly unlike the killing of a person.” The 
Valuable Futures Argument therefore trips on the 
mistaken assumption that the early fetus will de-
velop into a minded being. Because it will not, the 
early fetus does not have a valuable future.23
McMahan’s theory provides a neat response to Marquis 
– but only if one accepts his mind essentialism, and the 
idea that the preconscious fetus cannot develop into 
a conscious fetus, much less a person like you or me. 
That seems to me to fly in the face of the facts. It seems 
much more plausible to say that I was once a child, and 
before that an infant, and before that a fetus. Boonin, 
commenting on the pictures in his office of his son, Eli, 
at various stages after birth, says, “through all of the 
remarkable changes that these pictures preserve, he 
remains unmistakably the same little boy.” He also has 
another picture of Eli taken 24 weeks before his birth. 
Boonin writes, “there is no doubt in my mind that this 
picture, too, shows that same little boy at a very early 
stage in his physical development.”24 McMahan would 
have to say that the sonogram is a picture of Eli’s organ-
ism at a very early stage, but it is not a picture of Eli. I 
would say (and I assume Boonin would agree) that I am 
my organism, although this is not all that I am. How-
ever, to posit a “me” that is distinct from my physical 
self seems implausible, and the wrong way to defend 
abortion. Rather, I would say that when I was a fetus, it 
would have been permissible to abort me, because had 
I been aborted before I became conscious and sentient, 
it would not have mattered to me. It would have made 
no more difference to me than preventing my concep-
tion. So while I agree with Marquis that I was once a 
fetus, I deny that when I was a fetus, I had an interest 
or a stake in my valuable future. I think that when I was 
a mindless fetus, I had no interests at all.
Implications for Blastocysts
I began this paper with the question whether it is seri-
ously wrong to kill embryos at the blastocyst stage. I 
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want to suggest now that even if Marquis is right about 
the morality of abortion – that it’s wrong to kill fetuses 
because they have valuable futures it is not plausible to 
claim that pre-implantation embryos do. For unlike a 
fetus, an extracorporeal embryo is not developing into 
someone with a valuable future. Left alone (that is, 
not aborted), the fetus will (most likely) develop into 
someone with a valuable future. But the same is just 
not true of an embryo, whether left-over from IVF or 
deliberately created for research. Left alone, an extra-
corporeal embryo will just die. That’s not much of a 
valuable future.
It might be argued that the blastocyst could be im-
planted into a uterus, where it too would de-
velop into a baby, and thus it has, hypotheti-
cally, a valuable future. Of course, this is true 
only of viable embryos. Non-viable embryos 
– embryos incapable of further development 
– cannot have valuable futures. Presumably, 
even on Marquis’s view, it would be morally 
permissible to use non-viable embryos left 
over from infertility treatment in embryo re-
search (although I do not know if the stem 
cells derived from non-viable embryos could be used 
in treating disease, should ES cell therapies ever be 
developed). 
Most opponents of ES cell research make no distinc-
tion between embryos created by IVF and embryos 
created by cloning. However, on the Valuable Futures 
approach, there might be a considerable difference. We 
know that it is possible, under some set of conditions, 
for an IVF embryo to develop into a baby. Over 35,000 
babies were born in the United States alone in 2000 
(ASRM/SART Registry 2004). By contrast, biologist 
Rudof Jaenisch maintains that “a cloned embryo has 
little, if any, potential to develop into a normal human 
being.” He explains:
 By circumventing the normal processes of gameto-
genesis and fertilization, nuclear cloning prevents 
the proper reprogramming of the clone’s genome 
…which is a prerequisite for the development of an 
embryo into a normal organism. It is unlikely that 
these biologic barriers to normal development can 
be overcome in the foreseeable future.25
Jaenisch hastens to point out that the embryonic stem 
cells derived from a cloned embryo are functionally in-
distinguishable from those derived from IVF embryos, 
making them equally useful as a source for ES cells in 
research or therapy.
The chance a human embryo has of developing into a 
normal human being is irrelevant from the perspective 
of the biological humanity criterion. What matters for 
moral status is that the embryo is a human organism 
(although, as we have seen, there is considerable debate 
about when a human organism comes into existence). 
On this criterion, the moral status of the embryo is 
determined by its genetic humanity, not what it can or 
cannot develop into. Marquis, however, explicitly re-
jects the genetic humanity criterion, because it is hard 
to see why a merely biological category should make 
a moral difference. Clearly, he is sympathetic to this 
objection expressed by pro-choicers: “why, it is asked, 
is it any more reasonable to base a moral conclusion 
on the number of chromosomes in one’s cells than on 
the color of one’s skin?”26 By contrast, on the Valuable 
Futures approach, the developmental potential of an 
embryo makes all the difference in the world, since if a 
cloned embryo cannot develop into someone like you 
or me, it cannot have FLO. Killing it does not deprive 
it of its valuable future, and therefore, presumably, is 
not seriously wrong. 
This has interesting implications for the “created/
spare” distinction, appealed to by the National Bioeth-
ics Advisory Commission (NBAC) in its report, Cloning 
Human Beings. According to NBAC, it would be wrong 
to create embryos solely for the purpose of research; 
to do so would be inconsistent with the respect due to 
embryos as a form of human life. However, it would 
be ethically permissible to use embryos created for re-
productive purposes, which are no longer needed (so-
called “spare” embryos), since these embryos would be 
discarded anyway. President Bush considered this ar-
gument in his August 6, 2001 address to the nation, but 
ultimately rejected it. He maintained that it was imper-
missible to kill any embryos, even those that would be 
discarded anyway. On the valuable futures approach, 
it appears that the created/spare distinction has moral 
relevance, though precisely opposite to that claimed 
by NBAC. Whereas NBAC argued that only spare em-
bryos can be ethically used (and destroyed) in research, 
in the valuable futures approach, it would be morally 
acceptable to use cloned human embryos as sources 
of stem cells since they lack FLO, but unacceptable to 
use embryos discarded after fertility treatment, since 
they have FLO. They have FLO because they could be 
used to make babies, even if their creators do not wish 
It seems to me one thing to ascribe an ideal 
or hypothetical desire to a person whose 
desires have been distorted, and quite 
another to ascribe hypothetical desires to a 
being incapable of having any desires.
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to use them for this purpose. This is a rather startling 
implication of the Valuable Futures argument. The 
claim that it is morally better to use cloned embryos 
rather than embryos left over from infertility treatment 
is not one that I have seen anywhere in the Valuable 
Futures literature.
My own view is that we should reject the created/
spare distinction, although not for the reason President 
Bush gave. I think that it is permissible to use human 
embryos in research that kills them because embryos 
lack moral status. In my view, it makes no difference 
what the source of the embryos is, whether they are 
created by IVF or cloned; whether they are created 
specifically for research purposes or are left over from 
infertility treatment. However, I do not think it is per-
missible to use embryos for frivolous or trivial pur-
poses. I maintain that respect for human life requires 
that human embryos be used for morally important 
purposes, but that is a topic for another paper.27
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